Mining institutions, contention and credibility: Applying the Conflict Analysis Model to court cases in China by Xiuyun Yang & Peter Ho
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
The Extractive Industries and Society
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/exis
Original article
Mining institutions, contention and credibility: Applying the Conflict
Analysis Model to court cases in China
Xiuyun Yanga, Peter Hob,c,*
a School of Public Affairs, Xiamen University, Xiamen, Fujian, 361005, China
b Zhejiang University, School of Public Affairs, Zijingang Campus, Hangzhou, 310058, China
c Department of International Development, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
A R T I C L E I N F O
Keywords:
Land expropriation
Mining-induced displacement and resettlement
Conflict Analysis Model
Credibility thesis
Natural resource disputes
A B S T R A C T
China features a fast-growing mining industry with mounting environmental problems. This study examines the
dilemmas posed by this growth from the perspective of credibility and conflict. In doing so, we assess the source
of, and actors, timing, intensity, and outcomes linked to, mining-related conflicts using the Conflict Analysis
Model. Based on a set of court decisions (n = 123), conflicts can be grouped according to: 1) land acquisition;
and 2) mining-induced land subsidence. We ascertain that conflicts linked to land acquisition feature low in-
tensity; revolve around disagreement over (illegal) land rents (instead of legally required expropriation); and are
between villages/farmers versus mining companies. However, conflicts over land subsidence are high intensity;
revolve around compensation; and are between farmers and government. It is concluded that the institutions
governing the mining sector are a double-edged sword. On the one hand, rules on land acquisition and lease
function as an ‘empty institution’ as rural land is illegally leased to mining companies rather than formally
expropriated. This situation facilitates mineral exploitation while gaining credibility from a collusion of gov-
ernment, companies, villages, and farmers. Contrarily, the rules on land subsidence generate significant conflict
amongst the rural populace and call for greater involvement of the central government.
1. Introduction
Since implementing economic reforms in 1978, China has under-
taken numerous legislative efforts to govern and control mining. The
most important laws and regulations that directly pertain to the mining
industry are the Mineral Resources Law (1986, amended 1996) and the
Coal Industry Law (1996). Considering mining’s enormous impact on
land and the environment, the Land Reclamation Law (1988, amended
2011) and the Environmental Protection Law (1989, amended 2015)
are also considered important to the governing of China’s mining in-
dustry. In addition to the national Environmental Protection Law, China
has also promulgated separate laws and regulations with regard to
contaminating the air and water and pollutants such as dust and wastes.
Mining-related environmental protection measures can be found dis-
persed among pre-existing laws and rules. While lawmakers aim to
reduce and mitigate the multiple risks of mining, observers have sig-
naled three main issues that impact China’s mining institutions: 1) the
outdated nature of the current legislative framework (Jiang and Luo,
2013; Xie and Dai, 2011); 2) ambiguity in the regulations (MLR, 2013;
Sun and Xiao, 2011); and 3) administrative fragmentation between
involved authorities (Greenovation Hub, 2014).
As a result of these issues, China has witnessed a fast-growing
mining industry and currently ranks among the largest mineral pro-
ducers in the world. Meanwhile, mining has caused severe environ-
mental degradation including land subsidence, water and air pollution,
acid mine drainage, and disturbance of hydro-geology, amongst others
(Bian et al., 2010; Greenovation Hub, 2014; Yang and Ho, 2018).
Mining projects disrupt soil and water quality which subsequently re-
duce the viability of other industries such as agriculture, tourism, and
fishing that are dependent on those resources. Environmental de-
gradation has led to significant public health issues including higher
incidences of cancer, mercury-related diseases, and elevated lead levels
in blood (Li et al., 2014; Zhuang et al., 2009). Mining also induces the
risk of large-scale livelihood dispossession and resettlement (Yang
et al., 2017). For example, in Shanxi Province, there are reportedly over
1000 ‘floating villages’ (xuankongcun in Chinese) that are severely af-
fected by land subsidence, forcing farmers to be evacuated. It is esti-
mated that the number of displaced farmers as a result of mining is
more than 2.3 million, exceeding the number of people displaced by the
Three Gorges Dam (VanderKlippe, 2015; Xinhua, 2015; Zhang, 2013).
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Despite these externalities, there is a broad coalition of interests in
favor of mining in China as it has long been hailed as a complementary
livelihood to alleviate rural poverty (Ge and Lei, 2013; Lei et al., 2013;
Rui, 2005; Shen and Gunson, 2006). Local authorities especially have a
strong interest in supporting the mining industry as it provides a source
of revenue and economic growth. The presence of mining industries
also offer ample rent-seeking opportunities for local officials and village
cadres. Markedly, although often portrayed as victims, even local re-
sidents are rarely consistent or unanimous in their views on mining as a
large proportion depends on the income derived from that industry
(Yang and Ho, 2019).
Given China’s booming growth of the mining industry and the
double-sided nature of its presence for local communities as well as the
profound impacts it has had on the social and natural environment, it is
important to establish functioning institutions that reduce the risks and
hazards of mining. This study aims to explore the credibility of mining
institutions with particular reference to the rules that govern land ac-
quisition, land lease and mining-induced land subsidence. A primary,
but not sole, determining factor of institutional credibility is conflict.
However, as will be shown in the literature review below, there is in-
sufficient understanding of resource conflict, its measurement, and as-
sessment in general as well as that for mining conflicts in particular. In
this context, this paper aims to answer the following questions: 1) How
can we better qualify and quantify resource conflicts, and in particular,
mining conflicts? 2) How can we characterize the credibility of the mining
institutions that regulate land acquisition, lease and mining-induced sub-
sidence in China?
By applying an adapted version of the Conflict Analysis Model (Ho,
2016a, 2014) on 123 court decisions, we first arrive at a more quan-
titative and qualitative understanding of the current state of mining
conflicts in China. It is found that conflicts pertaining to land acquisi-
tion are mostly between farmers and mining companies and involve
low-intensity disagreement over land lease, and more particularly the
rent. The conflicts over mining-induced land subsidence and, by ex-
tension, displacement and resettlement feature a high degree of gov-
ernment involvement. More importantly, those insights into conflicts
help to understand the underlying regulatory roots and the magnitude
of conflicts. In many instances, it has led to a situation in which state
regulations were cast aside as an ‘empty institution’ (Ho, 2016b, 2005):
a functional compromise to show authorities that certain procedures
are in place while leaving enough leeway at the local level to carry out
rapid, unchecked mineral exploitation. In other words, the intended
function of the institution is undermined and overshadowed by the
intentions of local actors.
This study makes a double contribution to the study of resource
conflicts. First, it demonstrates that the Conflict Analysis Model in this
study that is predicated upon a dataset of court decisions can be suc-
cessfully employed for quantitative and qualitative insights into en-
vironmental resource conflicts. Those insights help to understand the
underlying root causes and the magnitude of conflicts, and it is sug-
gested that the model can be applied to other types of conflicts as well.
Second, this study has conducted an institutional analysis at the macro-
level and offers a view of those directly affected by mining in China
which, at the time of this writing, is the world’s largest producer of
numerous mineral resources including coal, iron ore, aluminum, tin,
zinc, bismuth, and gold (Reichl, 2018). It needs to be mentioned that
there are few studies that examine the social, economic and environ-
mental impact of mining at the (rural) community level in China.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a literature
review on resource conflict and describes the background and rationale
for the Conflict Analysis Model. Part 3 operationalizes the model in the
context of China’s legal conflicts and describes the dataset. Section 4
applies the model to analyze Chinese mining conflicts. Section 5 con-
cludes the article.
2. Opportunities and constraints in the analysis of resource
conflicts: a review
In light of their variety and complexity, conflicts are often addressed
separately in literature and include peace and conflict studies, con-
tentious politics, and legal studies. As Le Billon (2010) commented on
the research of resource wars, it is challenging to assess the trend and
explanatory factor of these conflicts due to the inconsistency of the
record of the form of conflicts. On the one hand, detailed case studies
use a broad-ranging definition that attempts to account for the various
physical, environmental, and cultural forms of violence; on the con-
trary, most of the quantitative literature adopts a narrow definition of
violence as armed conflict.
Similarly, most academic work on resource protests takes place
through case studies using a processing-tracing methodology
(Eisenhardt, 1989). In general, emblematic cases of successful or large-
scale mobilization are selected (Pu and Scanlan, 2012; Zhan, 2013). The
literature has been most interested in the process of how grievances
emerge and transform into action, how citizens mobilize social, poli-
tical and financial resources and receive effective remedies, and what
constraints and opportunities they face (Felstiner et al., 1980).
The disciplinary approach helps to improve our understanding of
conflicts because it focuses on the role of selected aspects in great
depth. However, they are often descriptive in nature and may not be
sufficient for providing a comprehensive approach to conflict analysis,
and it is difficult to generate a comparative and generalized pattern. For
example, the degree of involvement of each actor varies and yet is
unknown, inasmuch as the level and nature of resources conflicts often
remains uncertain. It is partially due to a low number of studies but,
more importantly, also to the absence of a conceptual framework for
the quantification and qualification of resource conflict.
In response to this, we adopted the Conflict Analysis Model as ex-
pounded in the credibility thesis and its underlying theory, in which
credibility is conceptualized as a continuum that ranges from ‘fully’ or
‘partially credible’, to ‘empty’ or even ‘non-credible’ (Ho, 2016a, 2013).
It puts forward that the opposite extreme of a credible institution is a
non-credible one while an empty institution is situated in the middle of
the theoretical continuum. An empty institution emerges as a symbolic
compromise for sensitive social and political issues as it is not enforced
and, therefore, causes fewer disputes. Stated differently, an empty in-
stitution is a set of rules that:
“…is, by and large, ineffective and ignored, yet simultaneously socially
accepted, little contested and, in effect, to a certain degree credible” (Ho,
2016b:1147)
It needs to be noted that an empty institution is not equal to a non-
credible set of rules. In effect, the empty, symbolic rules may shift into
non-credible rules when they are forcedly imposed, generating more
conflicts and social divides. The credibility thesis has been adopted in a
variety of empirical studies on conflicting claims over resources such as
grassland degradation in China (Fan et al., 2019; Zhao and Rokpelnis,
2016), water resource distribution in Bangladesh (Gomes and Hermans,
2018) and India (Mollinga, 2016), and artisanal mining in Ghana (Fold
et al., 2018).
Accordingly, the Conflict Analysis Model measures disputes through
social actors’ aggregate perceptions of conflict (Ho, 2016a, 2014) that
are operationalized through a comprehensive set of indicators: 1)
source, defined as the type of conflict; 2) frequency, defined as the
number of times a type of conflict occurs during a specified period; 3)
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timing, defined as the historical period or project stages of the most
frequent conflicts.1 4) intensity, defined in this context as the level of
litigation and appeal rate; 5) duration, the amount of time that a conflict
lasts as can be measured in days, weeks, months, or years; 6) nature, i.e.,
violent or non-violent, which can be further divided into civil dis-
obedience such as roadblocks, demonstrations, or acts of open violence
such as beatings, kidnappings, etc.; and 7) outcome as the result of the
conflict which may be measured as being positioned on a scale ranging
from solved, partly solved, to unsolved or a satisfaction ranking from
‘totally satisfied’ to ‘totally unsatisfied’.
The Conflict Analysis Model has been applied successfully for
evaluating the conflicts generated by agricultural land expropriation in
China (Ho, 2014) and dam projects in Malaysia (Ho, 2014; Nor-Hisham
and Ho, 2013). For example, it is generally believed that the Chinese
countryside is rife with conflicts over land. However, by measuring the
farmers’ perception of the source, frequency, and timing of land dis-
putes, it was actually ascertained that the overall perceived level of
conflict is low, albeit undeniably and critically linked to land evictions.
In this sense, the model thus helps to debunk perceived wisdom re-
garding resource conflict. The application of this Conflict Analysis
Model could also contribute to identifying the primary cause and in-
tensity of conflicts and prioritize areas for policy intervention.
In this paper, we apply the Conflict Analysis Model to study mining
conflicts as they are a suitable case for the following reasons. First, the
mining industry has generated some of the most contentious rural
conflicts in China. In the context of mineral extraction and processing,
mining activities can be incredibly environmentally destructive and,
over the course of many years, cause irreversible damage to sur-
rounding landscapes and disrupt local communities (Wang and Yuan,
2013; Zhan, 2013; Zhang, 2013). Second, mining-induced conflict is a
continuum of which the spectrum includes, on the one hand, those that
are violent in nature while, on the other hand, also encompassing those
that feature less violent acts of civil disobedience such as sit-ins or
peaceful demonstrations (Conde and Le Billon, 2017; Davis and Franks,
2014; Gutiérrez Rodríguez, 2019; Katz-Lavigne, 2019).
3. The Conflict Analysis Model and data description
3.1. Indictors for the level of conflict
In this paper, we examine the mining conflicts with four of the seven
indicators listed in the previous section: source, timing, intensity, and
outcome. The three remaining indicators (frequency, duration, and
nature), that relate something about the seriousness of a conflict are not
included here due to data availability. As a result, one may have a less
comprehensive understanding of conflict. Having said that, we may still
derive the seriousness of the conflict through the intensity assessed
from the level of litigation and appeal rate. Moreover, in addition to the
seven indicators mentioned above, we propose adding an additional
indicator, the actor, to the Conflict Analysis Model. Examining the actor
will help investigate the interaction between those involved and un-
derstand how their respective roles facilitate or frustrate the solution of
a conflict. An overview of the original and adapted Conflict Analysis
Model is provided below (see Table 1).
This study aims to highlight two fundamental types of mining con-
flict, those relating to: 1) mining land acquisition; and 2) mining-in-
duced land subsidence and the resulting displacement and resettlement.
By examining the causes of litigation, we can trace the underlying
source of the conflict. We consider the plaintiffs and defendants in
courts to be the actors. The timing is represented by the various stages of
mining operation: exploration, site design and planning, construction,
production, closure and reclamation. By examining this indicator, one
may conceptualize which stage of mine development is most prone to
conflicts.
As for the intensity of conflict, we examine the level of courts and
appeal rate of the cases. China’s court system is characterized by ‘four
levels and two instances of trials’ (Song, 2007). There are three levels of
courts of first instance (lower or jiceng, intermediate or zhongji, and high
courts or gaoji).2 Important cases may bypass the lower court and
proceed immediately to the intermediate or higher court (Stern, 2011).
Thus, to examine at which court level a conflict is adjudicated at the
first instance is an indication of the importance of a case.3 If the liti-
gants do not agree with the judgement made by a local court in the trial
of first instance, they have the right to appeal the case to the next
higher-level court, and ultimately, the Supreme People’s Court. An
appeal to a higher court entails additional costs which indicates that the
litigants are not satisfied and are willing to invest more resources.
Therefore, the rate of appeal could also be a suitable indicator for the
intensity of conflict.4
With regard to the outcome of conflicts, we investigated the judg-
ments at the first instance trial and also those that were appealed to a
higher level of court. This helps us to understand the consistency of
judgments and the preference towards certain parties. More im-
portantly, it also indicates whether these conflicts can be resolved in
court or not. Particularly unresolvable cases in which no court will hear
the case reflect the institutional loopholes which prevent farmers from
resolving their conflict.
3.2. Data
Our databases on mining cases are derived from two sources. The
first is the China Online Judgements Database5 (Zhongguo Caipan
Wenshu Wang) maintained by China’s Supreme People’s Court which
ordered that all levels of courts shall publish their finished cases online
beginning January 2014. Another complementary database is the PKU
Law Database (Beida Fabao)6 established by Peking University Law
School in 1985. It contains a great number of judicial decisions before
2013.
To build our dataset, we first searched the published adjudication
decisions using keywords including ‘mining’ (kuangye), ‘land lease’ (tudi
chengbao)’, ‘land rent’ (tudi zulin), ‘land expropriation’ (tudi zhengyong),
‘subsidence’ (taxian), and ‘relocation’ (banqian). This article mainly
focuses on the conflicts involving local communities, primarily farmers.
Therefore, after scrutinizing the text, we excluded non-relevant
1 As a transitional economy, China has witnessed the ebb and flow of farmers
protesting against excessive burdens and birth control, laid-off workers de-
monstrating for pensions, and evictees fighting against land expropriation and
housing demolition (Chen, 2003; He, 2014; Li and O’Brien, 1996; O’Brien and
Li, 1995). Therefore, timing will help to gain knowledge on the distribution of
conflicts through time.
2 The four level of courts, namely, lower people’s court, intermediate people’s
courts, higher people’s courts, and the Supreme People’s Court exercise in-
creasing judicial power. Two instances of a trial mean: first, litigants of a case
who challenge the judgments made by a local court in the trial of first instance
have the right to appeal the case to the next higher-level court only once.
Second, judgement of the first instance becomes legally effective if, within the
prescribed period for appeal, no party makes an appeal. Third, the judgement of
the court of the second instance shall be seen as final decision of the case and
cannot be appealed.
3 The level and location of the court is sometimes crucial to win a case. For
example, when pollution crosses borders, pollution lawyers tend to find a court
insulated from the polluter’s political influence but that also has jurisdiction
(Stern, 2011).
4 However, as the cases are ongoing, the appeal rate will be higher than the
figure in this article and should be read as a reference.
5 Zhongguo Caipan Wenshu Wang, wenshu.court.gov.cn.
6 Beida Fabao, www.pkulaw.cn. PKU Law database provides a unique code
number for each decision, which makes it easily identified and accessible.
Therefore, this code number is used in a footnote when cases are cited.
X. Yang and P. Ho The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
3
conflicts such as those within mining companies and between mining
companies or these between affected non-mining industrial enterprises
and mining enterprises.
For the convenience of analysis, we counted a bundle of decisions
on an identical issue as one case. An identical issue means the exact
same parties, facts, and legal questions. A single case can produce a
bundle of decisions in one of two ways. First, a collective lawsuit
(quntixing anjian)7 for one issue may be divided into individual cases in
order to maximize per case court fees, inflate statistics on the number of
cases that are handled, or defuse a collective action (Stern, 2011). This
is especially notable in the case of mining-induced land subsidence and
resettlement for which substantial numbers of farmers bring suit against
government authorities. Second, one issue may go through several trials
at different levels of court and thereby generate multiple verdicts. After
identifying an issue, repeated searches using a particular keyword of
the issue at different times were conducted in order to track any recent
progress. By consolidating cases from these two sources, we aggregated
a dataset with 123 instances of conflicts8.
In general, most disputes at the grassroots are solved through social
and political means; while only few enter the legal system (Michelson,
2007). There are two reasons for the reluctance to initiate legal pro-
ceedings. On the one hand, the inadequacy of legal knowledge, the
costs involved, and the potential of receiving no compensation hinder
one’s willingness to resort to legal approaches (Michelson, 2007). On
the other hand, there is a shared understanding of the judicial bias
favouring government officials, weak enforcement of judgements, and
potential agency retaliation (Gallagher, 2006; Li, 2014; O’Brien and Li,
2004). However, with the central government’s repeated emphasis on
the rule of law and gradual consolidation of the legal system, attempts
to resolve disputes via legal channels have steadily increased (Yip et al.,
2014). As scholars have duly observed, Chinese citizens tend to use
different methods, e.g., litigation, protests, and demonstrations, at the
same time to resolve disputes. The goal of such protest-supported liti-
gation is an effort to legitimate their actions but also to exert pressure
on the decision making of the courts and government agencies (He,
2014). Previous empirical research shows that published adjudications
are able to reveal the inner logic of court decisions and provide a
neutral lens to observe how societal and political forces penetrate the
courts (He and Su, 2013; Jin, 2015; Stern, 2010).
Relying on the officially documented court cases entails that an
uncertain number of unnoticed conflicts or conflicts outside of the legal
system are not included. However, one of the aims of this paper is the
demonstration of the Conflict Analysis Model, which could be
replicated when more data become available. Despite the signalled
limitations, we believe our dataset still has a certain degree of re-
presentativeness in terms of geographical diversity and the type of
mined minerals (Table 2).9
4. Applying the model to mining conflict in China
4.1. Land acquisition conflicts
China has imposed strict regulations on the acquisition of land for
construction purposes; this includes mining. Rural collective land10
needs to be formally expropriated by the state prior to mining and
commercial construction, and it is forbidden to directly lease or transfer
land use rights to collective land for non-collective, non-agricultural,
construction purposes (Article 63, Land Administration Law, 2004).
However, other studies and reports (Dang, 2010; Kang, 2009; Ma and
Table 1
Original and adapted Conflict Analysis Model compared.
Source: based on (Ho, 2016a, 2014).
Indicators Original conflict analysis model
(Ho, 2016a, 2014)
Adapted conflict analysis model
(this study)
Actors Not included Actors appearing in court (plaintiff, defendant, third party)
Source Type of conflict Divided into land acquisition and subsidence, latter of which subdivided into: 1) liability; 2) cause of damage;
3) relocation/resettlement; 4) compensation)
Timing Historical period or project stages Stage of mining operation
Intensity Level of litigation and appeal rate; economic costs Level of litigation and appeal rate
Outcome Status of conflict (resolved or unresolved) Decision of court
Frequency Incidence of conflict Not included
Duration Length of conflict (ranging from days to multiple
years, or ongoing)
Not included
Nature Violent or non-violent Not included
Table 2
Description of the sample (N = 123).
Source: compiled by the authors.
Category Frequency %
Type of mineral
Coal 74 60.2
Metalsa 27 22.0
Non-metallic minerals (Construction minerals, sulphur, etc.) 22 17.9
Region
East 35 28.5
Central 48 39.0
West 40 32.5
Year of Judgements
Before 2013 8 6.5
2014 22 17.9
2015 24 19.5
2016 35 28.5
2017 29 23.6
2018 5 4.1
Total 123 100
a Metals such as iron, zinc, manganese, gold and silver.
7 All-China Lawyers Association published a guideline placing restrictions on
lawyers’ involvement in ‘collective cases’; it defines ‘collective cases’ as cases
with more than ten plaintiffs (All-China Lawyers Association, 2006).
8 All cases are available in the SPC and PKU Law dataset and on file with the
authors.
9 A Guide to Investment in China’s Mineral Industry by the Ministry of Land and
Resources and Chinese Academy of Land and Resources Economics (MLR and
CALRE, 2012) provides a comprehensive description of the mineral resource
distribution. Our sample distribution slightly overlaps with the actual dis-
tribution, e.g., cases on coal conflicts concentrated in Shandong, Jiangsu,
Shaanxi, and so on while western areas such as Chongqing, Hunan, has a high
proportion of manganese, zinc related cases.
10 The rural collective in China consists of three levels: the township (xiang),
the administrative village (xingzhengcun) and the natural village or villagers’
group (zirancun or cunmin xiaozu). The latter is the actual, physical village,
whereas the administrative village may be comprised of several natural vil-
lages, and the township, in turn, several administrative villages.
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Zhang, 2001; State Council, 2006; Wu and Hu, 2007) have found that
the common practice is to directly lease land for mining from farmers.
We found that that virtually all of the conflicts pertaining to land
acquisition for mining are about rent (45 out of 48 cases) rather than
about compensation for the expropriation. Although this result in some
ways could have been expected as expropriation seldom occurs, it is still
surprising that these conflicts made it to court at all, since leasing is
prohibited under the Land Administration Law. This shows that the
regulations on land acquisition and land lease for non-agricultural
purposes are merely an empty institution, a symbolic rule that exists on
government paper only.
Litigations were generally lodged when agreements could not be
reached over the renewal of the lease (12 cases); when the mining
companies failed to pay the rent in time (23 cases), or when there was
disagreement on how to deal with land reclamation after the ceasing of
mining (seven cases). Government intervention was only evident in
three cases when the mining activities were terminated due to missing
mining or land use permits. After the operation ceased, the mining
companies filed a lawsuit to demand the village collective to reimburse
the rent that had already been paid (three cases). Note that from a legal
point of view, it is highly unusual that a mining company would seek
compensation for what, in fact, is illegal (i.e. the lease of collective land
for non-agricultural purposes).
By looking at the actors involved, conflicts are concentrated be-
tween farmers and mining companies. Table 3 shows that in the ma-
jority of cases (31 out of 48) litigants were farmers. Village committees
as the legal representatives of the rural collective acted as litigants
against mining companies in 17 out of 48 cases.
The conflicts over land acquisition between farmers, village col-
lectives, and mining companies are characterized by late timing and
low intensity. First, conflicts mainly arise at the mining production
stage (35 cases) instead of during the construction stage. At the start of
the mining activities, the lease contract and rent are mutually nego-
tiated and agreed on by farmers and mining companies. The conflicts
are initiated when one party no longer complies or agrees with the
contract, such as in case of delay of the payment of rent or refusal to
renew the contract. Second, without exception, the cases are all first
brought to the local lower people’s court while only 14 of the cases
were subsequently appealed for a second trial at an intermediate court.
The Land Administration Law explicitly forbids the direct lease or
transfer of collective land use rights to entities outside the village col-
lective for non-agricultural, construction purposes, such as mining
(Article 63, Land Administration Law, 2004).11 Therefore, land sub-
lease contracts (as farmers initially sign a primary or master lease with
the village collective) that are signed between farmers and mining
companies violate the law and should be invalidated (Article 52, Con-
tracting Law). However, as we have seen above, the inconsistency of the
application of law at the local level often prevents such invalidation,
and consequently, leaves this prohibition as nothing but an empty in-
stitution.
There are two additional issues that, in theory, should also lead to
the invalidation of lease contracts. The first is when the term of the sub-
lease exceeds the legal term of the (original) master-lease. China issued
the ‘30 Years No-Change-Policy for Rural Land Lease’ in 1998 under
which farmers can contract or lease (chengbao) the land for a 30-year
term, generally until 2028 (depending on the starting date of the lease).
If a farmer transfers or sub-leases (liuzhuan) his land to other parties,
the term shall not exceed the remaining period of the original term
(Article 33, Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas, 2002). Secondly,
when leasing land to parties outside the village collective, this must be
subject to a two-thirds majority vote by the villagers’ representatives
meeting, i.e., all villagers (Article 18, Law on Land Contract in Rural
Areas, 2002).
When cases pertaining to direct leases to mining companies are
brought forward, the court should annul these contracts as discussed
above. However, the largely symbolic nature of the rules on direct land
lease for mining can be ascertained through the inconsistent verdicts of
the lower courts: in most instances they deemed the case valid (35
cases), at times, the contract was ruled to be invalid (ten cases), or the
case was dismissed (three cases). The aforementioned prohibition for
non-agricultural, construction use, Article 63 of Land Administration
Law, is mostly cited as the reason to annul direct mining lease contracts.
Paradoxically, however, under exactly similar conditions, direct mining
lease contracts have also been considered as valid and legal as the
courts ruled that the contract was ‘based on mutual parties’ true will
and not in violation of any law and regulations’ (sic!).12
The conflicting verdicts illustrate that local courts reach different
interpretations on the legality of direct land leases for mining which, in
fact, are in flagrant violation of the law. When direct lease contracts
were deemed valid, the act of land acquisition was confirmed requiring
the delinquent party (i.e., the mining company) to perform its duty,
namely, to pay the land rent. On the other hand, when these contracts
were deemed invalid, the adjudications did not change the status of
land use. In these cases, it was still the responsibility of the involved
parties to resolve the disputes regarding the land rent.
From the analysis above, it can be contended that the regulatory
institutions (and their workings) on mining land acquisitions are an
Table 3
Conflict analysis of land acquisition for mining (N = 48).
Source: compiled by the authors.
Indicator Content Number
Source Disagreement over rent during contract renewal 12
Delay of rent payment 23
Land return after mining ceases 7
Rent disagreement due to government intervention 3
Not clear 3
Actor Farmer vs mining company 31
Village vs mining company 17
Timing Planning and construction stage 4
Production stage 35
Closure 9
Intensity First-instance Lower court 48
Appeal to Intermediate court 14
Outcome First-instance Not accept 3
Valid Contract 35
Invalid contract 10
Appeal Upheld 13
Partial change 1
11 Under the newly revised Land Administration Law, effective since 1
January 2020, land lease for non-agricultural use is no longer explicitly pro-
hibited. This, however, is not likely to make a great difference on the ground.
The revised law namely rules in detail the preconditions for the land lease for
non-agricultural use: 1) it must be designated as industrial/commercial land
under the overall land use plan; 2) it must have been legally titled as collective
construction land; 3) a contract between the concerned parties must have been
signed defining the plot boundaries, area, construction period, use period, land
use, planning conditions, and mutual rights/duties; 4) the concerned project
needs to have approval from at least two-thirds of all villagers or of two-thirds
of the villagers’ representatives; 5) the conditions for the land lease (e.g.
maximum period, mortgage, sub-lease, etc.) are stipulated according to the use
of state-owned land following concrete regulations by the State Council. As in
most cases agricultural land is directly leased to mining companies (and not
collective construction land that has been formally titled and designated as such
in the overall land use plan), it is uncertain whether the de facto situation will
significantly change, if the monitoring, supervision and penalizing are not
improved concurrently.
12 Further background information on the governance system in China is
provided in (Shue, 2018).
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outcome of the conflicting interests between the central government
and local actors. On the one hand, the strict regulations on land ac-
quisition by the central government seek to protect farmland in light of
national food security (Lichtenberg and Ding, 2008). On the other hand,
such strict regulations are contrary to the interests of local authorities
and mining companies in obtaining and exploiting the land while also
being unfavourable for the interests of farmers who hope to reap ben-
efits from the added value of their land.
Therefore, in numerous instances, mining companies directly lease
(agricultural) land from the village collective and farmers which allows
them to circumvent national regulations on land acquisition. This is
usually achieved with the tacit approval of local governments. This
“rule-in-use” is conducive to mineral exploitation, incites low intensity
conflicts, and rallies credibility from all actors: the local government,
mining companies, village collectives, and farmers. However, a sig-
nificantly different situation was found with regard to the disputes
around mining-induced land subsidence.
4.2. Land subsidence conflicts
In this section, we will examine the second type of mining conflicts:
those related to land subsidence and, in its wake, disputes over the
displacement and resettlement as villages have become uninhabitable
due to sinkholes, fissures, receding cropland, and damaged buildings.
Mining-induced land subsidence is one of the most dominant causes of
displacement and forced resettlement in China’s mining areas. A recent
study (Yang et al., 2017) has suggested that loopholes, inconsistencies,
and lacunas in the current regulatory and institutional framework are
major reasons for this.
First, the absence of the principles of ‘Free, Prior, and Informed
Consent’ or FPIC in laws and regulations not only incited the magnitude
of the problem but also created a pervasive culture of ‘mine first, clean
up later’. Due to land subsidence, which can occur years after mining
has commenced, forced displacement and resettlement are often the
non-desired and heavily contested outcome of mining. In fact, in our
analysed court cases, conflicts often arise during the mining’s opera-
tional stage.
Second, although the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) has been in-
cluded in certain mining laws and regulations, the liability shared be-
tween the central state, local state, and mining companies still needs
further clarification and readjustment. The current ambiguous respon-
sibilities are reflected in court cases for which plaintiffs must decide
against whom to bring legal proceedings: the government or mining
companies.
Third, government authorities have multiple roles: as an arbitrator
(mostly reserved for the land and resource administration bureaux)
they identify the polluter; as an implementer (i.e., the township gov-
ernment) they are charged with relocation and resettlement; and as a
regulator (i.e., county government and above) they are responsible for
specifying compensation standards for mining-induced damages (which
in itself also frequently incites conflict). Despite the difficulty of suing
government authorities in their multiple roles, a number of adminis-
trative cases were successfully brought to courts.
In the sections below, we will further examine these cases as sub-
divided over four specific sources of conflict: 1) who is liable and can be
sued; 2) challenges to the government as arbitrator (in establishing the
evidence of the cause of damage); 3) challenges to the government as
implementer (of relocation and resettlement); and 4) challenges to the
government as regulator (in setting the compensation standards).
4.2.1. Who to sue, the government or the mining company?
As mining activities are regularly associated with economic and
socio-psychological damage to local villagers, affected villagers should
be able to file a lawsuit against the responsible mining company or
government agency. However, the indistinct liabilities between mining
companies and the local government have left significant manoeuvring
space for the court to accept or reject cases.13
Here, we have collected 20 cases (see Table 4). The affected farmers
first filed lawsuits against the mining company (15 cases). The courts
immediately dismissed these by claiming that they did not fall within
the scope of the civil litigation accepted by the People’s Courts. The
courts hold that mining companies are not entitled to legally act as a
defendant in cases of relocation as this role belongs to the government
as stipulated in the regulations.14 Instead, cases should be dealt with as
administrative cases against a transgression by the government.
Subsequently, in a limited number of cases the farmers brought a
new (administrative) case against the government following the earlier
dismissal. However, as it is even more difficult to persuade the court to
accept an administrative case this only occurred in 5 cases. An example
may illustrate this difficulty. In 2015 a group of 32 villagers in
Yuncheng County, Shandong, filed a collective litigation against the
village relocation office under the Shandong Provincial Government.15
They pleaded to annul the relocation office’s decision on designating
their village for relocation, which was an administrative act rather than
policy. However, the lower people’s court did not accept the case and
claimed that the official address of the defendant did not fall under its
jurisdiction. Subsequently, the villagers appealed to an intermediate
court, requesting that the trial court transfer the case to the court with
jurisdiction over the case. Yet, the intermediate court again rejected the
case on the grounds that the trial court had no responsibility to transfer
the case as it did not accept it.16
In contrast to the decisions on land acquisition (see Section 4.1),
fairly consistent decisions are made. None of the cases were accepted at
the first and appellate courts. At the same time, the findings from these
dismissed cases actually raise more questions than answers. In China, a
precedent (panli) does not have a legally binding force, and courts
generally do not cite previous court decisions in their judgments (Ahl,
2014). One might also wonder why the courts continue to refer disputes
back to the government. This could be driven by the same logic as when
courts refuse to regard disputes over urban housing demolition as civil
litigation (He, 2007). On the one hand, higher government agencies do
not wish the courts to be involved in dispute resolution (He, 2007). On
the other hand, as a measure of self-protection, courts filter out and turn
away ‘troublesome’ disputes (He, 2009). It is the ambiguous liability
between government authorities and mining companies that provides
the courts with this legal manoeuvring space.
4.2.2. Challenging the arbitrator: the cause of damage
While it may seem obvious that land subsidence and house damages
are caused by underground mining, it is extremely difficult–not in the
least for lower-educated farmers– to provide sufficiently robust evi-
dence of what precisely caused the damage. This issue is further com-
plicated when more mining companies operate in the same area. To
deal with this issue, the Land and Resources Bureaux at the county level
13 In the court system, there is also disagreement on whether to consider
disputes on housing demolition compensation as civil litigation (He, 2007).
However, this is not to say that civil litigations against mining companies are
not possible. This paper examines the administrative litigations against gov-
ernment authorities to demonstrate the deep involvement in the mining-in-
duced displacement and resettlement cases.
14 For example, In Shandong, the provincial government promulgated an in-
terim regulation on relocating buildings above coal reserve in 1989. Article 5 of this
local regulation states that “ bureaux at county level organize and coordinate
the relocation of buildings above coal reserve, …, and deal with the relations
between the mining industry and farmers”.
15 In the PKU Law dataset, the codes are CLI.C.21646065 and
CLI.C.16602674.
16 The ruling (CLI.C.16602674) was accompanied by a citation of Article 21
of the Administrative Procedure Law: ‘Where a people’s court finds that a case it
has accepted (emphasis added) is not under its jurisdiction, it shall transfer the
case to the people’s court that has jurisdiction over the case’.
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have been charged with the task of identifying the polluter (Article 35,
State Council, 2003).
When farmers or mining companies are unsatisfied with the ad-
ministrative rulings by the local Land and Resources Bureau, they may
apply for an administrative review or file an administrative lawsuit. In
our dataset, we collected 20 administrative cases against the local Land
and Resources Bureau. Of these, farmers lodged nine while mining
companies lodged 11 cases (Table 5).
As previous studies on administrative litigation in China (Li, 2014;
Pei, 1997) have ascertained, local courts often find themselves in a
difficult position. On the one hand, local protectionism persists as a
result of which the courts tend to protect the interests of state agencies.
On the other hand, they must also be careful to maintain their own
credibility and not persistently rule in favor of the (local) government.
Having said that, it is difficult for the courts to examine government
agencies’ administrative acts. Stated differently, as the courts cannot
assist in determining the liable parties, they can only decide on the
legality of administrative procedures. Institutional credibility appears
to be low here, as out of 20 cases 18 were appealed to a higher court.
Out of these 20 cases, the Land and Resource Bureau lost two during the
first instance, and nine out of 18 appealed cases because of procedural
errors (for example, not issuing a written notification of the results of
the appraisal, or selecting a non-qualified appraisal company to identify
the cause of subsidence). In these cases, the administrative rulings were
revoked, and the cases were referred back to the Land and Resources
Bureau. At this point, it is evident that the legal system does not deliver
a credible remedy for farmers with regard to establishing the cause of
mining-induced damages.
4.2.3. Challenging the implementer: relocation and resettlement
Local governments, in most instances the township, are assigned the
responsibility for relocation and resettlement.17 They are, therefore, as
an implementer, challenged in court when villagers are unsatisfied with
the relocation. 21 court cases were collected in which local govern-
ments are challenged, of which two sources of conflict are dis-
tinguished: the eligibility for compensation (13 cases) and disagree-
ment with the amount of compensation (eight cases) (Table 6).
Beginning with the eligibility for compensation, groups that are
often excluded from compensation schemes include married-out
women18, senior farmers, and those without formal household regis-
tration (hukou) or agricultural land. For example, many married-out
women still have their hukou registered at their home village and,
therefore, are not regarded as members of the collective nor entitled to
compensation. Aforementioned groups have sought various courses of
action, and sometimes opt for filing a lawsuit against the implementing
agency. From the analysis, it is ascertained that farmers have a more
favourable position in court provided that they can substantiate their
eligibility for compensation. The losing parties, regardless of whether
that relates to farmers or the government, are likely to appeal to a
higher court. The decisions made at an intermediate court are also
generally in favor of the farmers (8/10 cases). However, to win in court
is often just a pyrrhic victory as it remains unknown whether such
rulings can also be enforced (Zhang and Ortolano, 2010). The township
government can resist and refuse to implement the court’s ruling. In
such a case, farmers can apply to the court again to have the ruling
enforced.19
The second set of cases relates to the insufficient compensation of
mining-induced damages to property (such as for housing or land).
These cases often arise due to disagreements over the measurement and
assessment of the extent and nature of mining-induced damages. The
primary task of the courts is to review the evidence that is presented by
the litigation parties. However, it is difficult for farmers to provide solid
evidence due to the legal costs and lack of legal knowledge, as a result
of which their cases often fail (of the reviewed cases, eight out of eight
failed).
4.2.4. Challenging the regulator: litigation against compensation standards
Unlike resettlement due to urban construction and hydropower
development, the national law provides no compensation standards for
resettlement induced by mining (Liu et al., 2006; Lu, 2002; Yang et al.,
2017). As a result, the compensation to property damaged by mining is
estimated according to local standards which are usually low. In
Jiangsu, for example, compensation for land affected by mining-in-
duced subsidence is at a maximum of 14,400 Yuan per mu, or 12 times
the annual land productivity (ALP) (1200 Yuan/mu; 1 Yuan ≈ 0.143
US$, and 1 mu = 1/15 ha), a number significantly lower than land
expropriated for urban construction (30 times of ALP) and hydropower
development (16 times of ALP) (Jiangsu Provincial Government, 2004).
Such value differences have triggered social and economic inequity
amongst the various compensation schemes for peasants. However,
according to administrative litigation procedures, only specific misdeeds
of the government can be considered for legal proceedings. As the
standard for compensation is regarded as an abstract administrative
decision instead of an individuated administrative act (O’Brien and Li,
2004), administrative litigations against the compensation standard
cannot be filed.
Table 4
Conflict analysis over liability of land subsidence (N = 20).
Source: compiled by the authors.
Indicator Content Number
Source Whose liability to mining-induced land subsidence and
relocation
20
Actors Farmer vs mining company 15
Farmer vs government agency 5
Timing Operation stage 20
Intensity First-instance Lower court 18
Intermediate court 2
Appeal to Intermediate court 17
Provincial higher court 2
Outcome First-instance Dismissed 20
Appeal Dismissed 19
Table 5
Conflict analysis of disagreement over cause of damage by land subsidence (N
= 20).
Source: compiled by the authors.
Indicator Content Number
Source Government as arbitrator to identify the responsible party 20
Actors Farmers vs Land and Resources Bureau 9
Mining company vs Land and Resources Bureau 11
Timing Operation stage 14
Operation & Closure stage [in case of several mines
around]
6
Intensity First-instance Lower court 20
Appeal to Intermediate court 18
Outcome First-instance Withdrawal 1
Land and Resources Bureau: Win 17
Land and Resources Bureau: Lose 2
Appeal Land and Resources Bureau: Win 9
Land and Resources Bureau: Lose 9
17 This was regulated beginning in the early 1980s, for example, the State
Council administrative measure on Coal Extraction under Buildings and Villages in
1980 and 1983, and some local regulations, such as the interim regulation on
relocating buildings above coal reserve promulgated by Shandong provincial
government in 1989.
18 Married-out women are peasant women who are married outside their
home villages but do not or cannot transfer their hukou (household registration)
to the destination village from their home villages.
19 This is demonstrated in two cases (out of ten cases that were won) that are
available by repeated search in the SPC database.
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In our dataset, 14 cases (Table 7) were collected in which farmers
challenged the local standards on mining-induced land subsidence and
resettlement. The farmers believe that they should be compensated in
accordance with the standard for construction land. Unlike the above
cases on the eligibility for compensation that involved single house-
holds, the cases in this context often involve a group of farmers.
However, in most instances, the cases were not accepted by the court.
For example, in Huaibei, Anhui Province, a group of affected
farmers initially filed litigation against the township government at the
county lower court to request that the township make up the deficiency
between the amount they received and the standard on construction
land.20 The lower court did not accept the case on the grounds that ‘the
township government was delegated by the county government to im-
plement the relocation, as a result of which the delegated authority (the
township) was not the proper defendant’ (but the county government).
Subsequently, a group of over 100 farmers filed collective litigation
against the county and prefectural governments to the intermediate
court at the prefectural level. The plaintiffs alleged that the compen-
sation standard for mining-induced land subsidence and resettlement
had not been updated for a long time. The intermediate court rejected
the case on the grounds that the county and prefectural governments
were not the responsible entities and had not undertaken any admin-
istrative actions towards the plaintiffs. This case was then appealed to
the provincial higher court where it was also rejected. Yet, the issue did
not end there, and a dozen cases (by the same group of farmers as well
as other farmers from the same county) were lodged collectively and
individually against different levels of government (township, county,
and prefectural level) at different court levels. To date, the outcome of
the issue is unknown.
5. Discussion and conclusions
This paper employed the Conflict Analysis Model of credibility
theory to systematically analyze mining conflicts in terms of the source,
actor, timing, intensity, and outcome (see Table 8). In this context, we
are now in a position to answer the first research question of this paper:
how mining conflicts in China can be better qualified and quantified.
These can be seen along four dimensions.
Firstly, the model has been beneficial for identifying the underlying
source of conflict. For the conflicts related to land acquisition, it was
determined that these were not induced by expropriation but by dis-
agreement between farmers and mining companies over the land rent.
To elucidate this apparent contradiction, we need to understand that
rural land for mining is, in practice, not expropriated (as required by
law) but directly leased to mining companies by the farmers and village
collective. This practice, although in flagrant violation of state regula-
tions, is evidently conducive to mineral exploitation and not only re-
ceives significant social support from local governments and mining
companies but from farmers and village collectives as well. For the
conflicts related to land subsidence, it was demonstrated that these
generally have a dual origin: 1) who is liable for the damage and 2) the
standard of compensation (often believed to be too low).
Secondly, the model has also contributed to a more comprehensive
understanding of the involved actors. In contrast to previous studies on
environmental litigation in China (Stern, 2011; van Rooij, 2010) for
which most cases were found to be directed against polluting firms, this
is only the case for mining land acquisition (and, as established above,
through direct lease rather than expropriation). In the case of land
subsidence, we see that cases are actually directed against government
agencies rather than mining companies. Government agencies were
frequently challenged in court by farmers in various capacities: 1) as an
arbitrator to assess the legal liability for land subsidence; 2) as an im-
plementer for resettlement and relocation; and 3) as a regulator for
setting the standards for financial and material compensation.
Examining the actors will help us to better understand the govern-
ment’s role in facilitating or frustrating the settlement of mining con-
flicts. In the case of mining land acquisition, the local government may
opt for a hands-off approach to facilitate mineral production even when
that directly contradicts the interests and regulations of the central
government. In the case of land subsidence, it is the mining companies
that should be responsible for the damages but, in practice, the risks
and responsibilities of mining have been shifted to the local and pro-
vincial governments. Stated differently, the conflicts signify convoluted
and complex relations between rural communities, mining companies,
and the state. Mining companies will pursue means to minimize the
impact only when they are required to meet the full costs of mining-
induced damage and resettlement. It is thus imperative to formulate
legislation that is more coherent and stringent that will force actors to
assume liability.
Thirdly, examining the timing has helped to gain additional knowl-
edge of which stage of mine development is most prone to inciting
conflicts. When comparing the timing of conflicts, an interesting finding,
consistent for both land acquisition and land subsidence, was that while
conflicts over land acquisition and relocation are generally expected to
occur during the construction stage prior to the beginning the mining,
we found that in reality conflicts tend to be concentrated during the
operation stage. While at the initiation of the mining activities mining
companies make mutually agreed upon rental contracts with farmers in
order to rapidly start the mining process, perhaps these are no longer
complied with later or, in some cases, farmers might ask for additional
compensation after mining starts. The time-lapse in relocation conflicts
Table 6
Conflict analysis of relocation and resettlement for land subsidence (N = 21).
Source: compiled by the authors.
Indicator Content Number
Source Eligibility for compensation 13
Disagreement with the amount of compensation 8
Actor Farmers against township government 21
Timing Production stage 21
Intensity First-instance Lower court 21
Appeal to Intermediate court 14
Outcome Eligibility case First-
instance
Township
government: Win
5
Township
government: Lose
8
Appeal Township
government: Win
2
Township
government: Lose
8
Disagreement on
compensation
First-
instance
Township
government: Win
8
Appeal Township
government: Win
4
Table 7
Conflict analysis of disagreement over compensation for land subsidence (N =
14).
Source: compiled by the authors.
Indicator Content Number
Source Disagree with the compensation standard 14
Actor Farmers against township government 11
Farmers against county and prefecture government 3
Timing Production stage 14
Intensity First-instance Lower court 10
Intermediate court 4
Appeal to Intermediate court 6
Provincial higher court 4
Outcome First-instance Not accepted 14
Appeal Not accepted 10
20 The court document numbers cited here are: CLI.C.8241509 and
CLI.C.15509664 from the PKU Law dataset.
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is caused by the fact that land subsidence as one of farmers’ prime
concerns over mining only becomes visible years after the commencing
of mining, that is, after damages to land and housing begin to occur.
Fourthly, in terms of outcome, we ascertained that courts, by and
large, made inconsistent adjudications in cases of mining land acqui-
sition. With regards to land subsidence, a majority of cases were re-
jected, leaving farmers at a disadvantaged position. This indicates that
legal procedures often fail to provide a satisfactory solution, channel
grievances, and resolve mining disputes. However, the root cause for
the persistence of conflicts in courts is likely a consequence from law-
makers designing rules in a way that either create loopholes or limit
enforcement. Moreover, rules are also lacking in the area of legal re-
sponsibility and assigned liability. At the same time, the judiciary, and
ultimately, the Supreme People’s Court, may be held accountable for
the inconsistent rulings.
Based on the findings of the conflict analysis, we may also continue
to the second research question: how to characterize the credibility of
Chinese mining institutions that regulate the land acquisition, lease and
mining-induced subsidence. For starters, credibility is not a monolithic
concept, and may critically vary in geo-spatial terms. More specifically,
in our case the credibility of Chinese mining institutions needs to be
distinguished per issue: i.e. mining land acquisition and lease vis-à-vis
mining-induced land subsidence (and related displacement and reset-
tlement). The former may be characterized as an ‘empty institution’.
This is exhibited in two ways: 1) although legally required, rural col-
lective land is not formally expropriated prior to mining; 2) Instead,
mining companies directly (and illegally) lease land from village col-
lectives and farmers. Local communities significantly benefit from this
illicit conversion of rural (agricultural) land to mining land as the costs
for expropriation, resettlement, and mining land conveyance are
avoided. As a result, state regulations on expropriation prior to mining
are, by and large, empty and symbolic, yet, simultaneously gain cred-
ibility from the local government, mining companies, village collectives
and farmers.21 This is reflected in the relatively low-intensity of con-
flicts with cases primarily going before the lower court and having a
medium appeal rate. It may also be evidenced in the fact that the
overall majority of analysed conflicts (45 out of 48) do not relate to
disagreements over expropriation, but to the land rent (which legally
should never have made it to court at all).
In contrast, conflicts over mining-induced land subsidence (and
related displacement and resettlement) are high-intensity with more
collective rather than individual litigation, a majority of cases being
referred to intermediate courts, and a high appeal rate. In effect, the
current regulatory framework for mining-induced land subsidence can
be deemed non-credible. To date, there are no national regulations and
standards for compensation for mining-induced damage and resettle-
ment, while local standards are scant and set too low (Yang et al.,
2017). Under such conditions, institutional intervention might be ad-
visable in at least two areas: 1) to clarify the liability for mining-in-
duced damages between the central state, the local state, and mining
companies; 2) to improve the litigation system by clarifying the dif-
ferent roles of the government and streamlining the procedural re-
quirements under which each of these can be brought before the court.
This study has tested the application of the Conflict Analysis Model
to the study of mining conflicts in China, one of the world’s largest
mineral producers. In so doing, we demonstrated how it can be used to
better qualify and quantify the disputes and contention that are gen-
erated over mineral resources. In addition, the model may have added
value for the study of resource conflicts at large, and could be employed
for disputes over forest, grassland, water, wetlands, energy, and other
resources. In this context, there might be a triple consideration for fu-
ture research.
One, this study made use of an adapted version of the Conflict
Analysis Model, under which certain indicators were added and some of
the original indicators – as described in (Ho, 2014) – were left out of the
model. More in particular, the frequency (incidence), the duration
(length), and the nature of conflict (violent/non-violent) have not been
included. For a more comprehensive assessment of institutional cred-
ibility, further research should include all eight of the indicators, while
we remain open for potential, newly identified variables.
Two, the model has been operationalized on the basis of a set of
court decisions. This approach offers opportunities while posing certain
constraints. Although it provides clear insights into resource conflicts as
they have appeared at lower level courts, it may be difficult to reach
conclusions about the scale of resource conflict at higher aggregate
levels (e.g. provincial or national). Moreover, this approach also does
not warrant any conclusions about the conflicts that do not make it to
court. For this reason, future research could test the applicability of the
model on the basis of other sources, such as interviews and survey data.
Three, conflict is not the only indicator for assessing the credibility
of institutions. More specifically, credibility has also been oper-
ationalized as: 1) actors’ aggregate perceptions, more specifically, along
Formal, Actual and Targeted dimensions, known as the FAT
Institutional Framework (Arvantidis & Papagiannitsis, 2020; Nor-
Hisham and Ho, 2016);22 2) a function of the relative speed of in-
stitutional change (Ho, 2018); and 3) endogenous transaction costs (Fan
et al., 2019). Against the backdrop of the above, it needs emphasis that
the understanding of institutional credibility in the management of
resources, in its very essence, needs to be driven by multi-dimensional,
multi-layered, and spatio-temporally sensitive approaches.
Table 8
Overview of conflict analysis of mining disputes.
Source: by authors.
Indicator Mining land acquisition Mining land subsidence
Source Disagreement over land rent Mostly disagreement over liability, followed by inadequate compensation
Actor Two-third of cases – farmers vs. mining companies; one-third of cases:
village collective vs. mining companies
• Concerning liability, relocation/resettlement, and compensation: all cases – farmers
(not village collectives) vs. local government
• Concerning cause of damage: Half of cases – mining companies vs. local government;
other half – farmers vs. local government
Timing Mostly operation stage Mostly operation stage
Intensity Mostly lower court,
appeal rate medium
Collective litigation, intermediate court,
appeal rate high
Outcome Court judgment inconsistent Most cases rejected;
farmers at disadvantaged position
21 The double-sided nature of mining for farmers in China – bringing socio-
economic benefits while causing severe environmental impacts in terms of land
subsidence and pollution – is also pointed out by Lu and Lora-Wainwright
(2014).
22 This indicator is based upon early research on the perception of credibility
in natural resource management (Pero and Smith, 2008) and more recent stu-
dies on the perceptions of property rights (Van Gelder, 2013, 2010).
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